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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

JS

JCSM-62-68

31 JAN 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: SEA CABIN (U)

1. (b) Reference is made to JCSM-698-67, dated 16 December 1967, subject: "Study of the Political-Military Implications in Southeast Asia of the Cessation of Aerial Bombardment and the Initiation of Negotiations (S) (Short Title: SEA CABIN (U)), " which provided preliminary comments on the subject study.
2. (b) Attached in the Appendix, and summarized in the succeeding paragraphs, are the judgments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the substantive issues raised in the SEA CABIN study. The views expressed in the Appendix have been formulated assuming, as a point of departure, that the San Antonio formula, as it pertains to cessation of bombing, has become operative; i.e., that the decision has been made by the President to halt aerial and naval bombardment in anticipation of prompt productive discussions. It is emphasized that these judgments do not constitute a revision of the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as stated previously in JCSM-107-67, dated 27 February 1967, subject: "A Settlement of the Conflict in Vietnam (U)," that the minimum price for a cessation of bombing of North Vietnam should be cessation of the movement of personnel and materiel into South Vietnam with effective inspection and verification.

3. (b) Recapitulation of substantive issues.

- a. What is the importance and impact of the air and naval campaign against North Vietnam?

- (1) The bombing of the North continues to impose heavy and accumulating pressure on North Vietnam that is contributing significantly to the achievement of US military objectives in South Vietnam.

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(2) The military pressure imposed by bombardment of North Vietnam is an essential part of our over-all strategy; it is one portion of our strategy in which the initiative is entirely ours. Bombardment is one of our strongest bargaining points; consequently, the price for its cessation must be high.

b. If the bombardment of North Vietnam is ceased, what should be the operational definition of "not take advantage"?

The following minimum actions by North Vietnam should be included in the US operational definition of "not take advantage":

(a) No artillery fire or other fire from North Vietnam directed at US/Republic of Vietnam/Free World forces.

(b) No ground attack across the DMZ.

(c) No increase in the movement of North Vietnam Army troops and supplies into South Vietnam or entry of new units into South Vietnam or Laos.

(d) No air defense or MIG interference with US reconnaissance flights over North Vietnam.

c. What time frame should be placed on the term "promptly"?

(1) In terms of critical time, the United States should enter discussions resolved to limit the time, and hence the risk, in accordance with the following minimum schedule:

(a) Initial contact (probably secret) should take place within 48 hours after cessation.

(b) Serious discussion should begin not later than one week after cessation.

(c) Discussions should be substantively productive within 30 days of cessation.

(2) If North Vietnam accepts and carries out the US conditions of "not take advantage" prior to or immediately following cessation of bombardment, a period of negotiations beyond 30 days might be acceptable. If no assurances are received following cessation, negotiations would, of necessity, have to be brief to avoid risk to allied forces.

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d. What criteria should be used in measuring "productive" discussions?

(1) Productive discussions should be measured in terms of time and reciprocal actions by North Vietnam which will de-escalate the war in South Vietnam.

(2) The United States should consider that negotiations are not being productive unless North Vietnam takes the following reciprocal actions (North Vietnam would act unilaterally or as a result of specific agreement):

(a) Withdraws all North Vietnam Army forces from the DMZ within 15 days of the cessation of bombardment.

(b) Ceases all personnel movement into South Vietnam within 30 days after the cessation of bombardment; enemy efforts at subsistence resupply (but not reinforcement) would be permitted.

(c) Agrees, within 30 days, that all North Vietnam Army troops (to include North Vietnam Army filler personnel in Viet Cong units) would return to North Vietnam 120 days after cessation; or, within 30 days, North Vietnam gives de facto evidence that North Vietnam Army troops are withdrawing.

(d) Agrees, within 15 days, to complete exchanges of prisoners of war as soon as possible but within 60 days after cessation of bombardment.

e. Under what conditions should bombardment be resumed?

(1) Bombardment should be resumed as soon as military judgment determines the enemy is gaining substantial advantage from the halt in bombing.

(2) The United States/Republic of Vietnam should resume bombardment whenever one or more of the following situations are perceived:

(a) Serious discussions are not in progress seven days after cessation (e.g., an agenda has not been agreed to), or have not produced specified reciprocal North Vietnam actions within 30 days.

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(b) North Vietnam takes advantage of the cessation while discussions are in progress.

(c) If a major enemy attack is initiated while a cease-fire is in effect.

4. ~~(b)~~ The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the Appendix be used, in conjunction with other pertinent documents, by Department of Defense representatives on the interdepartmental group that has been established to prepare a national position in the event North Vietnam responds to the San Antonio proposal.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:



EARLE G. WHEELER  
Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Attachments

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## APPENDIX

### ANNEX A - Substantive Issues in SEA CABIN Identified

- Tab A - What is the Importance and Impact of the Air and Naval Campaign Against North Vietnam?
- Tab B - If the Bombardment of North Vietnam is Ceased, What Should be the Operational Definition of "Not Take Advantage"?
- Tab C - What Time Frame Should be Placed on the Term "Promptly"?
- Tab D - What Criteria Should be Used in Measuring "Productive" Discussions?
- Tab E - Under What Conditions Should Bombardment be Resumed?

### ANNEX B - Recapitulation of Substantive Issues

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Appendix

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ANNEX A

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES IN SEA CABIN IDENTIFIED

1. (U) Purpose. To identify the substantive issues raised in  
the President's San Antonio proposal and discussed in the SEA CABIN  
study. 1  
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2.  Discussion 4  
  - a. SEA CABIN raises many problems that would confront the  
United States if North Vietnam accepted the San Antonio pro- 5  
posal or asked for clarification of terms. This paper clarifies 6  
these terms within the context of the inherent military implica- 7  
tions as assessed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 8  
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  - b. Pertinent to actions before and after cessation of bom- 10  
bardment is the degree of importance that both the United States 11  
and North Vietnam place upon the bombardment. How each measures 12  
the military pressure resulting from the bombardment will play 13  
a large part in how both sides determine their quid pro quo. 14
  - c. The SEA CABIN study identifies a range of scenarios asso- 15  
ciated with a possible cessation of bombardment. The most 16  
dangerous scenario to the United States/Government of South 17  
Vietnam is a cessation without prior reciprocal actions by 18  
North Vietnam. Those scenarios that require reciprocal actions 19  
by North Vietnam, prior to cessation of bombardment, reduce 20  
somewhat the risks to the United States. Regardless of the 21  
cessation situation that the United States may desire to accept, 22  
there should be criteria established for the key terms in the 23  
San Antonio offer. These criteria should reflect provision for 24  
security of allied forces and a reciprocal deescalation by 25  
North Vietnam. 26
  - d. The matter of "not take advantage" requires definition 27  
by the Department of Defense, since the immediate concern to 28

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the United States would be the security of its forces. Non-military actions by North Vietnam to "take advantage" are not likely to drastically change the political situation in South Vietnam.

e. The United States should clarify the time frame to be established as a measure of negotiating progress. The Korean negotiating experience must not be repeated. Communist tactics of intransigence and stalling can be reduced if the United States establishes a reasonable time frame for talks.

f. "Productive" discussions needs clarification. To what criteria should productiveness be keyed? Intangible promises, without verification, would not provide assurance that US objectives could be achieved. "Productive" discussions should be tied to demonstrated reciprocal actions by North Vietnam.

g. If the communists use the negotiations as a ruse for buying time, the United States would be confronted with a decision on resumption of the bombardment. Criteria for resumption should be established to assist negotiators in measuring the progress of talks.

h. Although there are numerous other problems posed in the SEA CABIN study, an addressal of the areas described above is considered appropriate at this time. The more important aspects of each of the above key issues are discussed in Tabs A thru E, hereto.

3. (...) Conclusions

a. US policymakers should develop operational definitions of the key terms in the San Antonio proposal. The military aspects of the war should weigh heavily in the determination of such definitions.

b. Key issues that should be addressed are:

(1) What is the importance and impact of the air and naval campaign against North Vietnam?

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- (2) If the bombardment of North Vietnam is ceased, what 1  
should be the operational definition of "not take advantage"? 2
- (3) What time frame should be placed on the term 3  
"promptly"?
- (4) What criteria should be used in measuring "productive" 5  
discussions? 6
- (5) Under what conditions should bombardment be resumed? 7

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## TAB A TO ANNEX A

1. ~~Re~~ Question: What is the importance and impact of the air and naval campaign against North Vietnam? 1  
2
2. ~~Re~~ Background 3  
  - a. One of the major conclusions of SEA CABIN is: 4  
"US intelligence evaluations of the impact of bombardment on NVN are sufficiently uncertain as to cast doubt on any judgment that aerial and naval bombardment is or is not establishing some upper limit on the DRV's ability to support the war in SVN. The effect on NVN itself is equally uncertain. If NVN is being seriously hurt by bombardment, the price for cessation should be high. However, if NVN can continue indefinitely to accommodate bombardment, negotiation leverage from cessation -- or a credible threat of resumption -- is likely to be substantially less. A penalty to the United States of under-evaluating the impact of bombardment of NVN would be an unnecessarily weak negotiating stance." 5  
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  - b. In JCSM 698-67, dated 16 December 1967, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recognized that the SEA CABIN study was restricted by the lack of sufficient reliable intelligence to permit the development of a more precise evaluation of the overall impact of the air campaign on the war-making capability of North Vietnam. This condition necessarily results in imprecise conclusions, which the Joint Chiefs of Staff cannot validate. For example, the Joint Chiefs of Staff affirm their judgment that the bombing in the North continues to impose heavy and accumulating pressure on North Vietnam that is contributing significantly to the achievement of US military objectives in South Vietnam. 18  
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  - c. In JCSM 567-67, dated 23 October 1967, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that a standdown of any kind in our operations for even so much as 24 hours is disadvantageous to our forces; longer standdowns are substantially more advantageous to the enemy, whose ability to exploit them is greatly increased as the respite afforded him is prolonged. 30  
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3. ~~Discussion~~

- a. Although it is not now possible to present a complete and precise evaluation of the impact of bombardment, it is clear from the available evidence that the air and naval campaign against North Vietnam is moving toward the achievement of the military objectives set forth by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In pursuance of those objectives, the air and naval campaign is being conducted to:
- (1) Make it as difficult and costly as possible for North Vietnam to continue effective support of the Viet Cong and cause North Vietnam to cease direction of the Viet Cong insurgency.
- (2) Interdict infiltration routes and destroy storage areas and staging bases that support the enemy forces in South Vietnam and Laos.
- (3) Bring military pressure to bear on the enemy's internal war-supporting resources.
- (4) Cause the North Vietnamese to pay an increasing price for the continued aggression in South Vietnam and Laos.
- (5) Bring military pressure to bear to obstruct and reduce imports of war-sustaining materials into North Vietnam.
- b. Evaluation of available bomb damage assessments contained in the SEA CABIN study and in the context of military objectives indicates that clear progress is being made.
- (1) Bombing adds greatly to the difficulty and cost of supporting the Viet Cong. Approximately 100,000 troops of the active North Vietnam military forces are required to be directly engaged in air defense with another 40,000 indirectly engaged or in supporting roles. Movement of goods

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is restricted mainly to periods of darkness. Substantial 1  
quantities of war materiel are destroyed in transit; for 2  
example, from February 1965 through October 1967, 5,200 3  
freight cars, 60 locomotives, and 25,100 watercraft were 4  
reported as destroyed. The rate of movement has been 5  
reduced, increasing nearly fourfold the travel time from 6  
Hanoi to the DMZ. Additionally, North Vietnam has been 7  
forced to divert an estimated 500,000-600,000 persons to 8  
full or part-time work in the repair, construction, and 9  
defense of lines of communication. Over 1,100 miles of 10  
road have had to be built as alternate routes or bypasses, 11  
and more than 1,500 destroyed or damaged bridges repaired 12  
or replaced. It is not possible to judge what impact the 13  
bombing has had on North Vietnam's will to continue direction 14  
of the Viet Cong insurgency as it is never possible to judge 15  
an enemy's will apart from his actions. 16

(2) Assessment of effectiveness in interdicting infiltration 17  
routes and storage and staging bases in South Vietnam 18  
and Laos is not pertinent to this paper since cessation of 19  
this portion of the air campaign is not contemplated. There- 20  
fore, this objective is not addressed at this time. 21

(3) Severe military pressure has been brought to bear on 22  
the enemy's internal war-supporting resources through bom- 23  
bardment. Barracks and supply depots have had to be aban- 24  
doned. Approximately 80 percent of North Vietnam's thermal/ 25  
hydroelectrical generating capacity has been put out of 26  
operation, and over 86 percent of the targeted petroleum 27  
storage capacity has been destroyed. The country's only 28  
cement, metallurgical, and explosives plants have ceased 29  
production. 30

(4) North Vietnam has been forced to pay an increasing 1  
price for its aggression. Export of apatite has been halted, 2  
and coal exports were reduced from 906,000 tons in 1966 to 3  
364,000 tons in the first nine months of 1967. Production 4  
of fertilizers was reduced from 132,000 tons in 1966 to 5  
46,000 tons in the first nine months of 1967. Paper produc- 6  
tion has been reduced 80 percent. Disruption of normal 7  
farming schedules and increased manpower problems contrib- 8  
uted to a 200,000 ton shortfall in the rice harvest of June- 9  
July 1967. Food imports increased from 77,000 tons in all 10  
of 1966 to over 319,000 tons in the first eight months of 11  
1967. Foreign exchange earnings have decreased 94 percent 12  
since the start of the bombing. 13

(5) Military pressure has been brought to bear to reduce 14  
imports of war materials. Full achievement of this objec- 15  
tive is impeded by restrictions on bombing and mining of 16  
principal ports, Haiphong, Hong Gai, and Cam Pha. However, 17  
despite restrictions, bombing has made importing more dif- 18  
ficult and costly. Road and rail interdiction have impeded 19  
movement of cargos from ports, and air strikes have forced 20  
halts in port operations. Dockyards, storage areas, and 21  
transshipment points have been heavily damaged. 22

(6) Although improvement of the morale of the people of 23  
South Vietnam was not stated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as 24  
an objective of the air campaign, it is worthy of note that 25  
their morale has been lifted and sustained by the knowledge 26  
that aggression is being punished and that the destruction 27  
of war is not being confined to their territory. SEA CABIN 28  
rightly notes this impact on the people of South Vietnam. 29  
c. It is never possible to set an upper limit as to the 30  
amount of bombing an enemy can absorb or to predict accurately 31

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the time when the enemy will no longer be able to accommodate 1  
to bombing. However, North Vietnam's persistent demands for 2  
a cessation of the bombing may well be an indication of the 3  
importance the enemy attaches to this element of US strategy. 4  
Therefore, SEA CABIN rightly points out that "a penalty to 5  
the United States of underevaluating the impact of bombardment 6  
on NVN would be an unnecessarily weak negotiating stance." 7

4. ~~Conclusions~~ 8

a. The bombing in the North continues to impose heavy and 9  
accumulating pressure on North Vietnam that is contributing 10  
significantly to the achievement of US military objectives in 11  
South Vietnam. 12

b. The military pressure imposed by bombardment of North 13  
Vietnam is an essential part of our overall strategy; it is one 14  
portion of our strategy in which the initiative is entirely 15  
ours. Bombardment is one of our strongest bargaining points; 16  
consequently, the price for its cessation must be high. 17

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TAB B TO ANNEX A

1. Question: If the bombardment of North Vietnam is  
ceased, what should be the operational definition of "not take  
advantage"? 1  
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2. (1) Background 4  
  - a. The President stated in his San Antonio proposal that the  
United States assumes "that while discussions proceed, North  
Vietnam would not take advantage of the bombing cessation or  
limitation." 5  
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  - b. SEA CABIN recommends that, prior to cessation, the United  
States should exact the following minimum actions in the form  
of an agreement from North Vietnam to reduce the risks to US  
forces: 9  
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  - (1) Stop artillery fire from and over the DMZ into South  
Vietnam prior to or immediately upon cessation. 13  
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  - (2) Agree that for North Vietnam to increase, over the  
current level, the flow of personnel and materiel south of  
19° N latitude would be to take advantage of cessation and  
that it will refrain from doing so. 15  
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  - (3) Accept "open skies" over North Vietnam upon cessation. 19
  - (4) Withdraw from the DMZ within a specified time, say  
two weeks, after cessation. 20  
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- c. If these concessions are not agreed to or carried out  
de facto prior to cessation, SEA CABIN states the risks to US  
forces would be greatly increased. 22  
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- d. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have previously stated\* their  
view that the minimum price we should exact for a cessation of  
our bombing in the North is a cessation by North Vietnam of its  
movement of personnel and materiel into South Vietnam and Laos,  
with effective inspection and verification thereof. 25  
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\* JCSM 107-67, dated 27 February 1967, subject: "Settlement of  
the Conflict in Vietnam (U)"

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3. [REDACTED] Discussion

- a. As has been stated previously, the air and naval campaign against North Vietnam is an essential part of our military strategy.. Consequently, if bombing is halted in accordance with the San Antonio offer, it is of the utmost importance that an operational definition be established for the President's words "not take advantage." 1  
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- b. Primary factors which enter into the determination of what constitutes taking advantage are: 8  
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- (1) The use of the North Vietnam sanctuary for military pressure on the allied forces. 10  
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  - (2) Increased movement of North Vietnam Army troops and supplies into the South and a consequent increase in US/ Government of Vietnam/Free World casualties. 12  
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  - (3) The need for effective verification of agreed or de facto actions. 15  
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- c. It would be intolerable to permit North Vietnam to fire at allied forces from a sanctuary that resulted from a cessation of bombardment. Even though the allies would invoke the principle of self defense in returning this fire, such an outright action by North Vietnam would be a clear case of taking advantage of the cessation. 17  
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- d. Since the movement of men and materiel into the South is currently impeded by the bombardment, any increase in such movement following cessation would be to "take advantage of" the security of allied forces. 23  
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- e. Of paramount importance to the discussion process would be an assessment of the extent to which North Vietnam is complying with stated preconditions for the cessation of bombardment. Lack- 27  
ing an effective international body to perform this function, the 28  
United States must make its own inspection. This function would 29  
require overflights of North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. 30  
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f. North Vietnam's adherence to the condition "not 1  
take advantage" can best be determined by North Vietnam-agreed 2  
or de facto actions that are tangible and readily observable. 3  
To simply exact an agreement that movement of personnel and 4  
materiel will be reduced, or ceased, is fraught with risks. 5

g. An important aspect of the San Antonio formula is that it 6  
implies that the United States is to be the judge of whether the 7  
enemy is taking advantage. The United States should determine but 8  
not necessarily announce all of the actions which we might wish to 9  
construe as taking advantage of the situation. For example, we 10  
should seek to preserve the option of resuming bombing in the 11  
event of a major enemy buildup between 19° north and the DMZ. 12

4. ~~(b)~~ Conclusions. The following minimum actions by North 13  
Vietnam should be included in the US operational definition of 14  
"not take advantage": 15

- a. No artillery fire or other fire from North Vietnam directed 16  
at US/Republic of Vietnam/Free World forces. 17
- b. No ground attack across the DMZ. 18
- c. No increase in the movement of North Vietnam Army troops 19  
and supplies into South Vietnam or entry of new units into 20  
South Vietnam or Laos. 21
- d. No air defense or MIG interference with US reconnaissance 22  
flights over North Vietnam. 23

## TAB C TO ANNEX A

1. [REDACTED] Question: What time frame should be placed on the term "promptly"? 1  
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2. [REDACTED] Background 3  
a. The President stated in his San Antonio proposal that 4  
"the United States is willing to stop all aerial and naval 5  
bombardment of North Vietnam when this will lead promptly to 6  
productive discussions." 7
- b. SEA CABIN states, under critical times to offset risks, 8  
that the "United States should enter cessation resolved to 9  
limit the time for NVN response generally as follows: 10
- "(1) Discussions should begin within 30-60 days of cessation. 11  
12
- "(2) Discussions should be productive within four months 13  
of cessation; i.e., actions are being taken or are agreed to 14  
be taken to reduce the threats posed by North Vietnam to the 15  
achievement of US/GVN military objectives in South Vietnam." 16
3. [REDACTED] Discussion 17  
a. Primary factors which enter into the determination of 18  
what time frame should be placed on the term "promptly" are: 19  
(1) The risks over time to US forces and objectives. 20  
(2) The communists' past practices of intransigence and 21  
stalling tactics in discussions. 22  
(3) The international and domestic pressures to settle 23  
the Vietnamese war. 24
- b. SEA CABIN presents a detailed explanation of North 25  
Vietnam's capability over time to move or relocate forces and 26  
supplies, to regenerate its industrial infrastructure, and to 27  
rebuild its LOCs and logistic system. A cessation of bombard- 28  
ment, coupled with prolonged talks, would permit major rebuilding 29  
of bomb damage in a period of about 60 days. During this period, 30

North Vietnam could acquire additional control and warning 1  
radars, improved communications, additional SAM and AAA crews 2  
and equipment, and stockpile missiles and antiaircraft ammu- 3  
nition. 4

c. North Vietnam must not be permitted to prolong the negotia- 5  
tions in the hope of wearing down the allied negotiators and, 6  
thus, obtain a settlement more favorable to the communists. A 7  
time limit on negotiations would tend to mitigate this possi- 8  
bility. 9

d. Once discussions are begun, there will be foreign and 10  
domestic political pressure for peace at any price or peace 11  
at some price. The United States should enter negotiations from 12  
a position of military strength. Allied military pressure in 13  
the South, combined with air interdiction of the infiltration 14  
routes in Laos will continue in order to provide an incentive 15  
to the communists for a prompt settlement. 16

e. If North Vietnam agrees to certain prescribed "not take 17  
advantage" conditions and carries out these conditions prior to 18  
a cessation of bombardment, the risks to the United States are 19  
reduced. In this situation, the period of time permitted for 20  
evaluating productive discussions could be of a longer duration 21  
commensurate with the reduced risks. However, if North Vietnam 22  
does not agree to certain "not take advantage" conditions prior 23  
to the cessation or does not carry out de facto the conditions 24  
following the cessation, then the risks to the United States 25  
are high. In this situation, the period of time permitted for 26  
productive discussions should be of short duration. 27

f. If North Vietnam has not taken de facto reciprocal action 28  
to deescalate the war prior to cessation, the time period for 29  
"prompt" and "productive" discussions should be brief. North 30  
Vietnam sincerity in entering discussions can be assessed in 31

part by the promptness with which it makes initial contact following cessation. This initial contact should be made within 48 hours. 1  
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G. Given the difficult terrain features, the United States could be faced with the prospect of indeterminate talks of four to six months before probable confirmation of marked increases in the movement of North Vietnamese Army men and equipment into South Vietnam. Since this course of action would be the most costly to the United States, and the most likely course to occur, a prudent assumption would be that infiltration is increasing significantly, and that nonproductive talks in excess of 30 days would unduly jeopardize the security of allied forces. It would be unreasonable to expect that our position should be jeopardized by waiting out the optimum period simply because the intelligence was not available to prove conclusively that increased movement of troops and supplies was occurring. It would be prudent to self-impose a shorter deadline for productive talks based on military precaution before, rather than after, the fact. 4  
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h. In summary, the time frame for prompt discussions should be a function of evaluating demonstrated enemy de facto actions, his past practice of stalling tactics in negotiations, and the reasonable likelihood that movement of troops and supplies will continue undetected for several months. 20  
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4. ~~(b)~~ Conclusions 25

a. In terms of critical time, the United States should enter discussions resolved to limit the time, and hence the risk, in accordance with the following minimum schedule: 26  
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- (1) Initial contact (probably secret) should take place 1  
within 48 hours after cessation. 2
- (2) Serious discussion should begin not later than one 3  
week after cessation. 4
- (3) Discussions should be substantively productive within 5  
30 days of cessation. (See Tab D.) 6
- b. If North Vietnam accepts and carries out the US conditions 7  
of "not take advantage" prior to or immediately following cessa- 8  
tion of bombardment, a period of negotiations beyond 30 days 9  
might be acceptable. If no assurances are received following 10  
cessation, negotiations would, of necessity, have to be brief 11  
to avoid risk to allied forces. 12

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Tab C to  
Annex A

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## TAB D TO ANNEX A

1. [REDACTED] Question: What criteria should be used in measuring 1  
 "productive" discussions? 2
2. [REDACTED] Background 3
- a. The San Antonio proposal offers cessation of bombardment 4  
 in North Vietnam "when this will lead promptly to productive 5  
 discussions." 6
- b. SEA CABIN links "productive" discussions to the concept 7  
 of "not take advantage" and risks over time. The study scenarios 8  
 include various deescalatory actions that North Vietnam could 9  
 take to demonstrate that it was not taking advantage of the ces- 10  
 sation. These actions could be agreed upon or could be uni- 11  
 lateral de facto actions. The execution of these actions 12  
 (concessions) relative to the commencement of cessation would 13  
 determine the criticality of risks over time. 14
3. [REDACTED] Discussion 15
- a. Implicit in the President's offer is the requirement for 16  
 reciprocal deescalatory action by North Vietnam in exchange for 17  
 a cessation of the bombardment. Reciprocal action by North 18  
 Vietnam should be the basis for measuring productivity of talks. 19  
 Since the cessation of US bombing is a major concession on our 20  
 part, we should reasonably expect reciprocal actions. If we 21  
 separate the concept of "not take advantage" from "productive" 22  
 negotiations, certain reciprocal actions by North Vietnam would 23  
 then become the criteria for measuring the productiveness of 24  
 the negotiations. 25
- b. The "not take advantage" actions should properly be those 26  
 de facto actions which relate to the security of allied 27  
 forces. As a measure of "productive" discussions, we should 28  
 expect reciprocal actions by North Vietnam which will contribute 29  
 to ending the war in the South. 30

941103-57

- c. Other factors influencing the determination of specific reciprocal deescalatory actions by North Vietnam are: 1  
    (1) The need to terminate North Vietnamese military support of the Viet Cong. 2  
    (2) The need to assess enemy actions toward a settlement. 3  
    (3) The need to reduce and finally stop movement of troops and supplies into South Vietnam. 4  
    (4) The need to restore the neutral status of the DMZ. 5  
    (5) The need for prompt repatriation of prisoners of war. 6  
d. North Vietnam has an obligation to its forces in the South. If North Vietnam Army forces are withdrawn, the Viet Cong would have even less likelihood of success against allied military pressure. We should measure North Vietnam's intentions by its willingness to extract North Vietnam forces (to include North Vietnam Army filler personnel in Viet Cong units) from the South. 7  
e. The problem of subsistence resupply of North Vietnam Army forces should be realistically considered. Since allied forces will have access to their own resupply, it is reasonable to expect North Vietnam to continue some subsistence resupply of its forces. To insist on complete cessation of the movement of personnel and supplies would give North Vietnam alternatives ranging from abandoning its forces in the South to continuing the struggle. 8  
f. Eventually the United States should require withdrawal of North Vietnam Army forces (to include North Vietnam Army filler personnel in Viet Cong units) as a favorable indication that the war in the South will subside. 9

941103-57

4. <u>Conclusions</u>	1
a. "Productive" discussions should be measured in terms of time and reciprocal actions by North Vietnam which will deescalate the war in South Vietnam.	2 3 4
b. The United States should consider that negotiations are not being productive unless North Vietnam takes the following reciprocal actions (North Vietnam would act unilaterally or as a result of specific agreement):	5 6 7 8
(1) Withdraws all North Vietnam Army forces from the DMZ within 15 days of the cessation of bombardment.	9 10
(2) Ceases all personnel movement into South Vietnam within 30 days of the cessation of bombardment; enemy efforts at subsistence resupply (but not reinforcement) would be permitted.	11 12 13 14
(3) Agrees, within 30 days, that all North Vietnam Army troops (to include North Vietnam Army filler personnel in Viet Cong units) would return to North Vietnam 120 days after cessation; or, within 30 days, North Vietnam gives de facto evidence that North Vietnam Army troops are withdrawing.	15 16 17 18 19 20
(4) Agrees, within 15 days, to complete exchanges of prisoners of war as soon as possible but within 60 days after cessation of bombardment.	21 22 23

341103-572

TAB E TO ANNEX A

1. Question: Under what conditions should bombardment be resumed? 1  
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2. Background 3  
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a. The communists may enter negotiations with the objective of prolonging the talks while they rebuild their infrastructure and send filler personnel to units in the South. They may expect that political pressures would prevent the United States from resuming once the bombardment had ceased. Given the risks involved over a period of time, some criteria for resumption should be established. 11  
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b. SEA CABIN states that "the conditions under which the bombardment of North Vietnam should be resumed cannot be determined in advance with assurance. However, the US/GVN should probably resume whenever one or more of the following situations are perceived: 16  
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"(1) The security of US/RVN/FWMAF in northern I Corps Tactical Zone is threatened.  
"(2) No discussions are in prospect 30-60 days after cessation.  
"(3) Discussions or negotiations are not productive of militarily significant DRV/NLF concessions within 4 months.  
"(4) NVN has infiltrated significant new forces into SVN - the raising of the NVA force level in SVN by a division equivalent or more (over 10%) is judged to be sufficient provocation.  
"(5) If an enemy attack of battalion size or larger is initiated while a cease-fire is in effect."

941103-573

3. Discussion

- a. North Vietnam can be expected to regenerate its industrial infrastructure and to rebuild its LOCs and logistic network. 1  
Reconstitution, relocation, and expansion of the air defense system would also be pursued vigorously during the cessation. 2  
While the opportunity for regeneration of its industrial infrastructure would be a great advantage accruing to North Vietnam 3  
from cessation, it should not, by itself, be considered provocative. 4  
However, the extent of North Vietnam's expansion of its air defense capability should be considered in timing a recommendation to resume bombing. 5  
11
- b. During a cessation in bombing, a range of military options in the South will be available to North Vietnam. There could be a continuation of movement into South Vietnam, although at a substantially lower level. There could be a continuation of or even an increase in frequency of battalion- and regimental-size attacks, perhaps directed principally at Army of Republic of Vietnam units and revolutionary development areas. There could be an increase in the frequency and intensity of attacks by fire on bases and on populated areas. Initiatives such as these by the North Vietnam Army would be difficult to establish as a justification for resumption of bombardment of North Vietnam, unless a cease-fire was in effect at the time.
- c. The enemy could take advantage of a cessation of bombardment of North Vietnam, even in the absence of expanded military operations by main force or regional units. A greater flow of personnel and materiel into South Vietnam would improve the capability of the Viet Cong, which, backed up by a strengthened enemy main force structure, could conduct more sabotage, terrorist, and guerrilla activities. This campaign would not convince a substantial segment of "world opinion" that a resumption of bombardment was justified.

94113-574

d. Obvious actions by North Vietnam to take advantage of tactical situations brought about by the cessation of bombardment which threaten the security of allied forces should be considered grounds for resumption. The magnitude of the violations would have to be weighed against the productiveness of discussions as measured by on-going reciprocal actions that might be in motion by North Vietnam to deescalate the conflict.

4. ~~C~~ Conclusions

a. Bombardment should be resumed as soon as military judgment determines the enemy is gaining substantial advantage from the halt in bombing.

b. The United States/Republic of Vietnam should resume bombardment whenever one or more of the following situations are perceived:

(1) Serious discussions are not in progress seven days after cessation (e.g. an agenda has not been agreed to), or have not produced specified reciprocal North Vietnam actions, as discussed in Tab D hereto, within 30 days.

(2) North Vietnam takes advantage of the cessation while discussions are in progress. (See Tab B, hereto.)

(3) If a major enemy attack is initiated while a cease-fire is in effect.

941103-575

## ANNEX B

## RECAPITULATION OF SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES

ISSUE	CONCLUSIONS
1. What is the importance and impact of the air and naval campaign against North Vietnam? (Tab A to Annex A)	<p>1. The bombing in the North continues to impose heavy and accumulating pressure on North Vietnam that is contributing significantly to the achievement of US military objectives in South Vietnam.</p> <p>2. The military pressure imposed by bombardment of North Vietnam is an essential part of our overall strategy; it is one portion of our strategy in which the initiative is entirely ours. Bombardment is one of our strongest bargaining points; consequently, the price for its cessation must be high.</p>
2. If the bombardment of North Vietnam is ceased, what should be the operational definition of "not take advantage"? (Tab B to Annex A)	<p>3. The following minimum actions by North Vietnam should be included in the US operational definition of "not take advantage":</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. No artillery fire or other fire from North Vietnam directed at US/Republic of Vietnam/Free World forces.</li> <li>b. No ground attack across the DMZ.</li> <li>c. No increase in the movement of North Vietnam Army troops and supplies into South Vietnam or entry of new units into South Vietnam or Laos.</li> <li>d. No air defense or MIG interference with US reconnaissance flights over North Vietnam.</li> </ul>
3. What time frame should be placed on the term "promptly"? (Tab C to Annex A)	<p>4. In terms of critical time, the United States should enter discussions resolved to limit the time, and hence the risk, in accordance with the following minimum schedule:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Initial contact (probably secret) should take place within 48 hours after cessation.</li> <li>b. Serious discussion should begin not later than one week after cessation.</li> <li>c. Discussions should be substantively productive within 30 days of cessation. (See Tab D to Annex A)</li> <li>5. If North Vietnam accepts and carries out the US conditions of "not take advantage" prior to or immediately following cessation of bombardment, a period of negotiations beyond 30 days might be acceptable. If no assurances are received following cessation, negotiations would, of necessity, have to be brief to avoid risk to allied forces.</li> </ul>

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ISSUE	CONCLUSIONS
4. What criteria should be used in measuring "productive" discussions? (Tab D to Annex A)	<p>6. Productive discussions should be measured in terms of time and reciprocal actions by North Vietnam which will deescalate the war in South Vietnam.</p> <p>7. The United States should consider that negotiations are not being productive unless North Vietnam takes the following reciprocal actions (North Vietnam would act unilaterally or as a result of specific agreement):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Withdraws all North Vietnam Army forces from the DMZ within 15 days of the cessation of bombardment.</li> <li>b. Ceases all personnel movement into South Vietnam within 30 days after the cessation of bombardment; enemy efforts at subsistence resupply (but not reinforcement) would be permitted.</li> <li>c. Agrees, within 30 days, that all North Vietnam Army troops (to include North Vietnam Army filler personnel in Viet Cong units) would return to North Vietnam 120 days after cessation; or, within 30 days, North Vietnam gives de facto evidence that North Vietnam Army troops are withdrawing.</li> <li>d. Agrees, within 15 days, to complete exchanges of prisoners of war as soon as possible but within 60 days after cessation of bombardment.</li> </ul>
5. Under what conditions should bombardment be resumed? (Tab E to Annex A)	<p>8. Bombardment should be resumed as soon as military judgment determines the enemy is gaining substantial advantage from the halt in bombing.</p> <p>9. The United States/Republic of Vietnam should resume bombardment whenever one or more of the following situations are perceived:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Serious discussions are not in progress seven days after cessation (e.g., an agenda has not been agreed to), or have not produced specified reciprocal North Vietnam actions within 30 days. (See Tab D to Annex A)</li> <li>b. North Vietnam takes advantage of the cessation while discussions are in progress. (See Tab B to Annex A)</li> <li>c. If a major enemy attack is initiated while a cease-fire is in effect.</li> </ul>